Oman pushes Gulf non-aggression pact

Oman has proposed a non-aggression pact for all eight Gulf littoral states, a move that would formally bind Iran and Iraq alongside the six Gulf Cooperation Council members. The initiative aims to create a structured security architecture in a region where distrust remains high and external powers have long dominated defense arrangements. As another escalation between Iran and the United States looms, the proposal offers a diplomatic alternative to ongoing military tensions.

Oman’s Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, outlined the plan during a lecture at Cambridge University in the UK. He described the pact as an essential prerequisite for inclusive regional security. The idea is not new. In November 1976, the foreign ministers of all eight states met in Muscat to pursue collective security after Britain withdrew its forces from the area. It remains the only time the eight nations have gathered at a single table for such a purpose.

Subsequent geopolitical shifts stalled progress. The Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war pushed the region toward defensive arrangements that later hardened into exclusion. For decades, Iran was viewed primarily as a threat. This perspective ignores a geographic reality: Iran holds roughly half the Gulf coastline. A security framework that excludes a state with such a large maritime border is structurally incomplete.

Interest in a regional pact revived in 2019. In May of that year, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif proposed a non-aggression pact with Gulf neighbors during a visit to Baghdad. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov endorsed the idea. Later that September, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani launched the Hormuz Peace Endeavour at the United Nations General Assembly. Gulf states largely dismissed the initiative, citing Iranian support for armed groups that threatened stability.

Recent events have shifted the diplomatic landscape. In May, the Financial Times reported that Saudi Arabia was discussing a non-aggression framework with Iran, modeled on the Helsinki process used between the US and Russia during the Cold War. This month, Qatar’s defense minister called for dialogue between the GCC and Iran, joined by Turkiye and Pakistan, toward a non-aggression agreement. Oman’s current proposal is the latest iteration of this regional shift. Muscat is well positioned to mediate, having hosted US-Iran talks in 2025 and February 2026.

Critics question why the region should trust a state that has previously threatened its security. Oman itself protested to Iran after drone attacks targeted Musandam and Al Wusta in July. Reassurance alone is insufficient. Inclusion must mean obligation. Membership would bind Iran as strictly as any other signatory, providing mechanisms to constrain threatening behavior and address grievances. The pact would require commitments against the use of force, interference in internal affairs, attacks on civilian infrastructure, and support for armed groups conducting cross-border strikes.

Negotiations would likely follow a gradual approach. The eight countries would first identify shared interests, including territorial security, functioning ports, reliable energy exports, and uninterrupted trade. Initial talks should produce limited, reciprocal measures such as military hotlines, rules for maritime encounters, and notification protocols for exercises. Oman would facilitate the process, but each state would represent itself. Muscat’s channel to Tehran does not grant it a mandate to negotiate for its neighbors.

The Strait of Hormuz is the logical starting point. Oman and Iran have already outlined a temporary navigation arrangement. However, Albusaidi conceded that implementation requires compromise between Washington and Tehran, including reversing wartime actions that halted maritime traffic. Any framework must respect international navigation rights. Armed groups present the most difficult challenge. Governments would undertake not to direct or materially support cross-border attacks by such actors. Compliance would be demonstrated through verifiable steps and procedures for establishing evidence and requiring corrective action.

The United States and Israel, both parties to this year’s war on Iran, would remain outside the pact. Yemen’s war involves actors whose agendas a Gulf arrangement could not easily bind. The framework would not settle every conflict touching the Gulf. Its value lies in making it harder for those conflicts to become wars among signatories. Credibility will depend on observable conduct, such as fewer attacks and functioning crisis channels, rather than the signatures alone. The immediate goal is establishing that disagreement does not entitle any state to endanger another’s security.